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VaccinesBackground: Growing conflict and insecurity played a major role in precipitating polio outbreaks in the
Horn of Africa and the Middle East. In Angola, the early post-conflict situation was characterized by
the presence of many inaccessible zones and districts due to insecurity and poor infrastructure.
Partnership with the Angolan Army health service (AAHS) was one of the innovative strategies that
the Polio Eradication Initiative (PEI) introduced into the country to support the polio vaccination cam-
paigns in insecure and hard to reach zones.
Methods: Before embarking on creating a partnership with Angolan military it was essential to make
high-level advocacy with top military decision makers to engage the leadership in the process for better
and sustainable support to the strategy. The principal supports provided by the AAHS were the adminis-
tration of oral polio vaccine, vitamin A, deworming agents, social mobilization, monitoring campaign
quality, and surveillance. Distribution of logistics using military vehicles and helicopters to hard to reach
and insecure zones was also part of the support.
Results: Using this partnership it was possible to reach a significant number of children in insecure and
hard to reach areas with polio vaccine and other child survival interventions. The military partnership
also contributed in increasing the demand and addressing rejection for the polio vaccine.
Conclusion: Military is a potentially productive force that can be used for any development activities in
any country. The Angolan experience has demonstrated that it is possible to form a partnership with
the military for basic health intervention activities with little training and investment.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Since the establishment of the global goal of eradicating polio in
1988, huge progress has been made. The number of endemic coun-
tries has dropped from 125 to only two, Pakistan and Afghanistan.
These successes were achieved through effective and safe vaccines,
strong surveillance and global and local innovative strategies [1].
Growing conflict and insecurity in 2013 played a major role in
precipitating outbreaks in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East.
Increased instability in parts of Pakistan also played a role in lim-
iting access to children, allowing continued transmission of polio
virus. While insecurity was not the sole contributor to these out-
breaks, the disruption of immunization activities led to areas oflow population immunity and ongoing insecurity hampered out-
break response [2].
Many innovative partnership strategies have been utilized in
different countries to address challenges of the same nature. The
collaboration of military institutions in the implementation of
massive health activities has been an important strategy for ensur-
ing coverage not only in times of armed conflict but also in times of
peace. Several examples can be found in the response of epidemics.
The most recent example is found in the global response to the
Ebola outbreak experienced in Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia
[3,4].
In Angola, the early post-conflict situation was characterized by
the presence of many inaccessible zones and districts due to inse-
curity and poor infrastructure. There are still challenges of reach-
ing those areas through immunization and other child survival
strategies. In 1999, Angola experienced the biggest poliomyelitis
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113 deaths caused by wild poliovirus type 1 and 3 [5,6].
Partnership with the Angolan Army Health Service (AAHS) is
one of the innovative partnerships that the Polio Eradication Initia-
tive (PEI) introduced into the country to support the polio vaccina-
tion campaigns in insecure and hard to reach zones which were
later scaled up to routine immunization and other child survival
interventions.
The partnership with AAHS was initiated in 1999 with the
involvement of the military in polio Supplementary Immunization
Activities (SIAs) targeting to reach children in insecure and hard to
reach areas. These children were otherwise would always be
missed by both the routine and supplementary immunization
activities.
This paper describes the AAHS partnership in polio eradication
activities and their contribution to national polio vaccination
campaign.
2. Methods
Before embarking on creating a partnership with Angolan mili-
tary it was essential to make high-level advocacy with top military
decision makers to engage the leadership in the process for better
and sustainable support to the strategy. The Director of AAHS is a
member of the Inter-Agency Coordination Committee (ICC) for
polio and vaccine preventable diseases. The Minister of Health
chairs the ICC and it is composed of top public health officers
and the representatives of United Nations partner agencies [World
Health Organization (WHO) and United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF)], CORE Group (a USAID-funded nongovernmental organi-
zation), Rotary, Angolan Red Cross, Social Society, and AAHS.
The principal supports provided by the AAHS were the admin-
istration of oral polio vaccine, vitamin A, deworming agents, social
mobilization, monitoring campaign quality, and surveillance.
Distribution of logistics using military vehicles and helicopters to
hard to reach and insecure zones was also part of the support.
3. Planning
Joint planning with the military teamwas an integral part of the
strategy which determines the effectiveness and efficiency of the
partnership. Mapping and updating of the hard to reach and inse-
cure zones was accompanied by micro planning for logistics, mate-
rials, and personnel.
The military vaccination teams were composed of two persons
as any other vaccination team. Indications for the use of military
vaccinators were: (a) hard-to-reach villages located uphill or in
some mountains, (b) insecure areas, and (c) filling the gap in the
situation of under-recruitment of vaccinators.
During the planning care was taken not to underestimate the
target population in each zone in order to avoid any potential logis-
tic and material stock out during the implementation phase of the
strategy. Clear chronogram of the preparation and implementation
phase was also part of the planning.
4. Materials
Leaflets were prepared and provided to the military vaccinators
to guide them on the target population, the importance of the vac-
cine, the dose to be administered, the route of administration and
other important technical issues. The leaflets also addressed social
mobilization issues and community case definitions for immedi-
ately reportable diseases.
Though military vaccinators had to use their uniform when act-
ing as vaccinators, during deployment in the field, they receivedpolio campaign T-shirts and caps (usually white in color with the
campaign logo) to help the community identify them as
vaccinators.5. Training
Military vaccinators were trained by municipal level officers
supported by provincial level supervisors at least 1 day before
the implementation of the campaign in their local quarters. The
training included a practical demonstration using recording and
reporting formats, vaccines and leaflets elaborated to guide civil
vaccinators. The leaflets covered several topics as the target popu-
lation, the importance of the vaccine, the dose to be administered,
the route of administration and other important technical issues.
The leaflets also included social mobilization issues and commu-
nity case definitions for immediately reportable diseases.6. Implementation
The military teams vaccinated children by house to house visits
and conducted active case search at the same time by asking the
families for the presence of any affected person with immediately
notifiable diseases like Acute Flaccid Paralysis (AFP), suspected
measles cases and others. By the end of the daily vaccination activ-
ities, they received snacks and drinks for refreshment. In some
cases, military teams brought their own meals that also repre-
sented a contribution to the implementation of the polio campaign.7. Coordination and supervision
Each military group deployed had an officer in charge to super-
vise and coordinate support with the municipal technical team. At
the local level, coordination was done with the health facility in
charge of the vaccination area.
The coordination site for the military team was usually at mil-
itary health facilities or posts. In the case of absence of military
health facility or post, a nearby civil health facility or any vaccina-
tion campaign coordination site will serve as a coordination center.8. Monitoring the quality of the campaign
One more field of the collaboration of the military partnership is
their involvement in the implementation of independent monitor-
ing of the polio campaign coverage.
Administrative data of the number of vaccinated children came
from daily tally sheets filled in by vaccination teams and summa-
rized sequentially by villages, coordination areas, and communes.
Though this was the main information to assess vaccination results
and assess the coverage of target population for each area, it was
also assumed that there is a concern for the quality of this data
due to poor recording, consolidation, and transcription of data. In
several cases, some data on the number of vaccination children
submitted by volunteer vaccination teams did not correspond to
the number of vaccine doses received. There were also reports of
unmotivated vaccination volunteers that that reported an exagger-
ated number of children vaccinated in their assigned area.
As a complementary monitoring and evaluation mechanism, an
independent monitoring (IM) survey of unvaccinated children was
carried out in each province by CORE group through visits to a cer-
tain number of houses in selected villages to determine the propor-
tion of children missed during the campaign. If the proportion of
the cumulative number of missed children was <10%, the campaign
was considered of high quality, AAHS provided personnel to assist
in IM.
Table 2
Comparison of average number of children vaccinated by military and other
vaccination volunteers during polio immunization days in Angola.
Type of vaccination team Average number of children vaccinated
per a vaccination team per day
Volunteers 80–240
Military 250–400
National average 120
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Since the initiation of the PEI, the partnership with the AAHS
made it possible to reach a significant number of children in inse-
cure and hard to reach areas with polio vaccine and other child sur-
vival interventions. The military vaccinators reached children not
only in security compromised and hard to reach areas but also in
poorly covered areas with the vaccination volunteers. During every
polio campaign <200,000 children in 76 districts were reached
through military partnership (Table 1).
A comparison was made between the number children vacci-
nated daily by military vaccinators and other volunteers during
polio campaigns. The average number of children vaccinated per
day by a military vaccination team was found to be double than
the other volunteer vaccinators (Table 2). It was also witnessed
that there were less number of missed children in military covered
area than the areas covered by vaccination volunteers.
As polio campaigns activities were conducted repeatedly since
the initiation of the eradication program, the military vaccinators
also contributed in increasing the demand and addressing rejection
for the vaccine much better than young vaccination volunteers.
During independent monitoring surveys, less rejection is wit-
nessed in areas covered by military vaccinators than areas covered
by other volunteers.
Angola being conflict-torn country, there were many districts
and villages with destroyed infrastructure. In this regard, the part-
nership allowed the use of military vehicles and helicopters to
transport vaccines, health workers, and other logistics to security
compromised areas, border crossing points and areas with poor
infrastructure.
In Angola, the military partnership is not limited to polio erad-
ication activities but also extended to other programs like inte-
grated child survival interventions, epidemic prone disease
surveillance, and social mobilization.10. Discussion
We found that military partnership in polio eradication cam-
paigns has enabled to reach children in insecure and hard to reach
areas in Angola. At this stage of PEI end game, polio SIAs strategies
should be reoriented to focus on chronically missed children and
other vulnerable subpopulations with targeted use of the most
effective SIA strategies [2,7]. The military partnership has big
strategic importance in boosting the immunity of children and pre-
venting continuous transmission of poliovirus in high-risk areas.
Mass immunization campaigns—most often launched as a strat-
egy to eradicate polio and increasingly being used for other dis-
eases. Achieving a high percentage of vaccination coverage, while
common and necessary, may not be sufficient to eliminate or erad-
icate polio. Outbreaks of diseases occur in under-immunized inac-
cessible populations living within otherwise highly immunized
populations [8–13]. In Angola, one of the major contributingTable 1
Number of hard to reach areas and population reached through military partnership in po
Areas of military
involvement
Number of
districts
Number of
villages
Estimated target
population
Insecure areas 13 51 59,300
Hard to reach areas 31 104 138,877
Border crossing points 14 81 18,846
Filling gaps of
vaccinators
18 79 48,000
Total 76 305 265,023factors for this is the quality of vaccination volunteers. The volun-
teers are usually young and less responsible contributing to an
increased number of missed children and to the high rate of rejec-
tion of the vaccination by the community. The military vaccinators
being matured and responsible, they manage to reach those under-
immunized children and improve the confidence of the community
in the service. In this regard, the military partnership not only
helps to reach the unreached, but also improve the ownership
and collaboration by the community and family members.
In countries with weak health systems, it is suggested that
innovative delivery mechanisms be used to scale up effective child
survival interventions in a manner complementary to ongoing
efforts to strengthen national health systems [14,15]. In Angola
in addition to the weak health system, there is a shortage of trained
health care workers to provide the basic child survival services like
routine vaccination, administration of vitamin A and deworming
agents [16]. Provisions of these services do not require advanced
knowledge and skills. Therefore, through the military partnership,
it was possible to reach children in hard to reach and insecure
areas with these basic interventions.
Lack of access to health care is a barrier not only to child
survival interventions but also disease surveillance. Under these
circumstances, there are fewer opportunities for interfaces
between healthcare staff and children who are for example at risk
for polio. Lack of access constraints the detection and reporting of
Acute Flaccid Paralysis (AFP) cases by limiting opportunities for
cases to be observed and investigated [17]. In this regard, the mil-
itary partnership in Angola has helped in overcoming late detec-
tion and notification of AFP and other epidemic-prone diseases in
areas with limited access to health services. Hence, contributing
to early investigation and management of outbreaks.
Although the military partnership in polio campaigns and other
child survival interventions has been successful in reaching the
unreached, it has some limitations. Some families may consider
the service as being mandatory given that it is provided by the mil-
itary. Another limitation is that polio campaigns and other health
service intervention data were not strictly treated separately for
those areas covered by the military partnership. Because of this,
it was not possible to statistically demonstrate the impact of the
partnership on the outcome of the interventions.
In conclusion, the military is a potentially productive force that
can be used for any development activities in any country. The
Angolan experience with PEI has demonstrated that it is possiblelio campaign activities, Angola.
Explanation (characteristics of the areas)
Areas of conflict, robbery
Areas with difficult topography, poor infrastructure, remote areas, highly
populated areas
Formal and informal international border crossing points
In cases of inadequate number of recruited volunteers
5158 L. Fekadu et al. / Vaccine 34 (2016) 5155–5158to form a partnership with the military for basic health interven-
tion activities with little training and investment. It can also serve
as an outline of other programs who wish to make use of the
military for addressing public health issues in hard to reach and
insecure areas.
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